EU Raw Material Partnerships: Mutual Benefits or Green Extractivism?
A critical analysis of the EU’s Strategic Partnerships on Raw Materials, with a focus on Kazakhstan, Chile, and Rwanda
Karin Küblböck / Simela Papatheophilou / Bernhard Tröster / Leonhard UlriciWien, September 2025 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.60637/2025-rr25

As part of its efforts to secure access to critical raw materials (CRMs), the EU has concluded Strategic Partnerships on Raw Materials with 14 non-EU countries. These partnerships aim to diversify supply sources and to deepen ties with resource-rich countries, thereby strengthening the resilience of CRM supply chains. They are part of the EU’s partnership approach that has become a central feature of the EU’s diplomacy efforts in the context of growing geopolitical competition, supply chain vulnerabilities, and China’s dominance in the CRM sector.
This paper critically examines these partnerships and analyzes the nature, objectives, and implementation of the 14 Strategic Partnerships currently in place, focusing particularly on the cases of Kazakhstan, Chile, and Rwanda. These countries represent different regions, income levels, and resource endowments, offering insights into how the EU’s partnership approach unfolds in different contexts.
The Strategic Partnerships are formalized through Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and roadmaps, though the latter are mostly not publicly available. Our analysis reveals that their stated goals – local value addition, ESG compliance, and mutual benefits – often remain vague and are formulated without civil society participation. Where legally binding treaties, such as Free Trade Agreements constrain partner countries’ domestic policy space to generate greater local benefits of raw material extraction, the provisions of Strategic Partnership do not mitigate these constraints.
The impacts of the partnerships ultimately depend on the extent to which companies can be successfully engaged in the cooperation, which, in turn, crucially depends on funding opportunities. Yet EU funding structures are fragmented and heavily reliant on blended finance mechanisms and private sector alignment. This reliance limits the scope for achieving declared objectives such as industrial upgrading in the respective partner countries.
We conclude that, while the EU’s Strategic Partnerships are framed as equitable and sustainable, in practice they risk reproducing extractive asymmetries under a new geopolitical logic. Without more concrete commitments, stronger transparency, and real incentives for inclusive development in partner countries, these partnerships fall short of delivering the promised mutual benefits on the one hand, and sustainable supply security on the other.